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IN RE GOOD DEAL SUPERMARKETS, INC.:
A HASTY INVALIDATION OF UCC § 2-702(2) AS A
STATUTORY LIEN UNDER § 67(c)(1)(A) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
A seller who sells goods on credit to an insolvent buyer may reclaim the goods under § 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code,
if he demands their return within ten days of the buyer's receipt. The
ten day requirement is inapplicable, however, if the buyer makes a
written misrepresentation of his solvency to the seller within three
months before he receives the goods. 2 This right of reclamation is
based on the common law right of. rescission whereby a seller could
rescind a sales contract and recover the goods upon a showing that
the buyer obtained them fraudulently.3 The UCC provision relaxes
the burden of proving fraud placed on earlier sellers by treating any
insolvent buyer's receipt of goods on credit as a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency, and therefore fraudulent as against the particular seller.' The right is limited, however, by § 2-702(3) of the
Code.'
Subsection (3) of § 2-702 subordinates the seller's claim to the
rights of buyers in the ordinary course of business and good faith
purchasers who take the goods from the insolvent buyer prior to the
seller's demand for their return. The limitation is based on apparent
ownership and other estoppel theories' adhered to in § 2-403 of the

UCC] § 2-702(2) provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on
credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made
within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency
has been made to the particular seller in writing within three months
before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim
goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter

Id.

,Id.
3 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

70.41 at 483 (14th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as

COLLIER].

4 UCC § 2-702, Comment 2.

UCC § 2-702(3) provides:
The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the
rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under
this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes
all other remedies with respect to them.
UCC § 2-403, Comment 1. The rational behind the limitation is to protect
subsequent purchasers, without notice, who take the goods from the buyer relying on
his possession as an indication of his ownership.
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UCC,1 which outlines the rights of such buyers and purchasers. As no
other limitation is placed on the seller's right to reclaim, in the absence of such buyer or purchaser a seller who meets the requirements
of § 2-702(2) should have little difficulty recovering his goods. The
probable intervention of bankruptcy in most cases, however, raises a
serious problem with regard to the seller's right to the goods when
opposed by a trustee in bankruptcy.
Section 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act 8 invalidates as against
the trustee "every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon
the insolvency of the debtor." 9 Thus a trustee, pointing out that the
seller's right to reclaim is premised on the presence of an insolvent
buyer, arguably need only show that § 2-702(2) is a statutory lien in
order to defeat the seller's claim. In the recent case, In re Good Deal
Supermarkets, Inc.,' the court was of the opinion that the trustee
made such a showing, and therefore held the seller's reclamation
invalid in bankruptcy under § 67(c)(1)(A).
In the Good Deal case, the seller-petitioner delivered a quantity
of potatoes to Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., on credit on June 13,
1973. The following day Good Deal filed a petition for arrangement
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. On June 19, 1973, within
the ten day reclamation period set out by the New Jersey version of
§ 2-702(2) of the UCC," the seller demanded the return of the potatoes. Upon Good Deal's failure to comply with this demand, the seller
sought relief before the bankruptcy court. In defense, the trustee
raised the issue whether the New Jersey Code provision was a statutory lien invalidated in bankruptcy by § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee, and
the seller appealed to the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey.
In affirming the bankruptcy court's ruling, the district court examined the "purpose and effect' ' '2 of both the New Jersey Code provision and § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court first stated
that § 2-702(2) of the Code had the effect of benefiting a particular
class of creditors and promoting a state created priority. Analogizing
these characteristics of § 2-702(2) to the characteristics of other state
statutory liens, the court then deemed them to be "the very evils"
7 UCC § 2-403.
1 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970).
9Id.
15 UCC REP. SERV. 624 (D.N.J. 1974).
N.J.S.A. 12A:2-702(2) (Supp. 1974).
,2 15 UCC REP. SERv. at 625.
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which § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act was designed to eliminate.' 3 The court supported this conclusion by pointing out that the
1966 amendment to § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Act'4 was directed at state
created statutory liens which promoted priorities contrary to those
established under the Act.'" Because § 2-702(2) of the New Jersey
Code "disrupt[ed] the federally created order of priorities just as
surely as those state created priorities specifically designated as
'liens,' ",, the court concluded that it could have no application in a
bankruptcy proceeding.
The court's holding that § 2-702(2) of the UCC is a statutory lien
within the purview of the Bankruptcy Act serves notice that a reclaiming seller may never recover fraudulently obtained goods when
opposed by the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. The absolute effect of
this rationale should have encouraged the court to make a more thorough examination of the purpose and effect of the Code and bankruptcy provisions in question. Such an examination would have revealed that the issue was more complicated than the court's opinion
indicates. Indeed, had the court given the necessary attention to the
history of § 2-702(2) of the Code and § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Act, it might easily have reached the opposite result.
Prior to the enactment of the UCC, most states permitted a seller
of goods to rescind a sales contract and recover the property from the
buyer only upon a showing that he was induced to enter the contract
by the buyer's fraudulent misrepresentation.' 7 Although the fraud in
such cases might relate to any material aspect of the sale,'" it most
often concerned the buyer's misrepresentation of his financial condition. As a result, bankruptcy frequently intervened between the bargain and the seller's attempt to rescind. The intervention had little
effect on the seller's right,'9 however, as the trustee in bankruptcy
13 Id.

at 626.
11The 1966 amendment to § 67(c)(1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 53-60 infra.
,1 The priority order for bankruptcy is described in Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11
U.S.C. § 104 (1970).

15 UCC REP.

SERV. at 626.

, 4A COLLIER 70.41 at 483.
, An example of fraudulent conduct not involving a misrepresentation of solvency
would be a buyer's falsification of identity. See National Silver Co. v. Nicholas, 205
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1953) (seller failed to prove fraud alleged).
" The only difficulty the seller might have encountered arose from § 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). That section gives
the trustee, on the date of the filing of the petition, the rights of a lien creditor by legal
or equitable proceedings. Id. Most states, however, held the rights of the reclaiming
seller superior to those of a lien creditor. 4A COLLIER 70.41 at 485. One exception arose
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took title to the bankrupt's property subject to revestment in the
seller upon rescission. 0 The real difficulty for the seller lay in proving
fraud.
The states generally required the seller to demonstrate conclusively that he was induced to enter the contract by an insolvent buyer
who concealed his insolvency and who had no intention to pay for the
goods. 2' However, presumably because a demonstrable intent not to
pay was too difficult to establish in the majority of cases, other courts
concluded that such intent was present where the buyer was aware
that he was hopelessly insolvent.3 Their decisions were based on the
valid presumption that when an insolvent person orders goods, he has
done so with an intent not to pay for them. The most persuasive
language supporting the utilization of this rationale was employed by
Judge Learned Hand in California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo:
[A] man's affairs may reach such a pass that ordinarily honest persons would no longer buy, if they had no greater chance
to pay; and the seller is entitled to rely upon that implication.
He may assume that the buyer would not promise if the odds
were so heavy against him. . . . In that event, if the buyer
knows that he has no such hope, he deceives the seller, as much
as though he intended not to pay at all. 4
Despite the existence of this trend toward lessening the seller's
burden,5 most courts nevertheless required the seller to establish
fraudulent conduct by proving a demonstrable intent not to pay in
order to recover the goods.26 Thus, in cases where an insolvent buyer
in cases where the bankrupt was a trader and the state had a traders act. Id. See
Waltham Piano Co. v. Smith, 37 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1930).
Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876); 4A COLLIER 70.41 at 483.
21 The requirement that the seller prove that at the time of the sale the buyer had
no intention to pay for the goods was established in Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631,
633-34 (1876). Most of the later cases, until enactment of the UCC in the particular
state, maintained this precedent. See Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REV. 435, 454 (1971).
2 See, e.g., Sternberg v. American Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934); California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933); Elbro Knitting Mills v.
Schwartz, 30 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1929); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir.
1928).
2 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933).
24

Id. at 530.

The trend is generally represented by the cases cited in note 22 supra. However,
there is slight authority supporting rescission and recovery on an even less exacting
standard: the buyer's innocent misrepresentation of solvency. See 4A COLLIER 70.41
at 487.
2 See, e.g., United Construction Co. v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670 (6th Cir.), cert.
2
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purchased goods in reliance on a long line of credit which suddenly
dried up,'2 or where officers of the buyer company were negligently
unaware of their company's insolvency,2 or where the buyer merely
had an illusory 9 intention to pay, pre-Code courts held that there was
no fraud and the seller had no right to rescind. Because of the various
results in the courts as well as the unrealistic burden imposed on the
seller in those jurisdictions requiring a demonstrable intent not to
pay, the drafters of the UCC attempted to ease the burden of the
defrauded seller. 0 Therefore, Code § 2-702(2) relieves the seller of the
requirement of proving fraud, an insolvent buyer's receipt of the
goods being conclusive on the matter.3 ' However, contrary to Professor Llewellyn's belief that the broadened power of reclamation given
the seller by § 2-702(2) "should find acceptance and approval in the
bankruptcy courts,"3 it has faced stiff challenge by trustees since its
inception.
The initial challenge arose from a limitation placed upon the
seller's right to reclaim by § 2-702(3) of the Code. This section, prior
to a 1966 amendment, subjected the seller's right to the rights of a
lien creditor, or one who obtained a lien on the property in the buyer's
possession before the seller reclaimed his goods. Since § 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Actn specifically grants the trustee in bankruptcy the
powers of a lien creditor under applicable state law, the intervention
of bankruptcy gave rise to the question whether the trustee's power
was superior to the right of a subsequent reclaiming seller. Because
§ 2-702(3) of the UCC merely stated that the seller's claim was "subject" to the rights of a lien creditor, and those rights were not clearly
defined elsewhere in the Code, 34 the issue of who should prevail bedenied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942); Rochford v. New York Fruit Auction Corp., 116 F.2d 584
(2d Cir. 1940); In re Tate-Jones & Co., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1949); John
Heidsik Co. v. Rechter, 291 Mich. 708, 289 N.W. 304 (1939).
u Schroth v. Monarch Fence Co., 229 F. 549 (6th Cir. 1916).
n In re General Lumber Products Co., 21 F.2d 979 (D.Md. 1927).
" In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D. Mass. 1928).
0 Llewellyn, Memorandum in N.Y Law Rev. Comm'n, Report and Record of
Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, Legis. Doe. No. 65, 126 (1954).
31 See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
3 Llewellyn, Memorandum in N.Y Law Rev. Comm'n, Report and Record of
Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, Legis. Doc. No. 65, 126 (1954).
33 Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). The trustee in.bankruptcy
is also granted the status of lien creditor in Article 9 of the UCC. UCC § 9-301(3).
UCC § 9-301(1)(b) does contain a statement of the rights of a lien creditor.
However, those rights are only defined as they pertain to the holder of a security
interest. This merely raises the issue whether § 2-702(2) grants a security interest.
Although it has been suggested that the seller does have a security interest, perfectable
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came a subject of great controversy."
Due to this controversy, the Code's Permanent Editorial Board
recommended the deletion of the lien creditor limitation in 1966.36
The purpose of the proposed deletion was to eliminate the Code's
confusing cross-reference regarding the rights of lien creditors as well
as to establish uniformity among the states." Since § 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee only the power of a lien creditor
under applicable state law, the amendment should finally resolve the
priority controversy in favor of the defrauded seller. The applicable
state law is the UCC, and § 2-702(3) specifically designates those who
may prevail over a reclaiming seller. The purposeful deletion of lien
creditors from § 2-702(3) should thus result in the interpretation that
a lienor may not prevent a reclaiming seller from recovering his
goods. 8 Because of the uncertain result under former § 2-702, and the
on demand for the goods, apparently no court has adopted this rationale. See 4A
COLLIER
70.62A at 720-21.
31 The controversy arose primarily among the commentators, whose various solutions are briefly but accurately summarized in Note, In re Federal'sInc.: A New Way
For the Trustee in Bankruptcy to Defeat a Reclaiming Seller, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 922
(1974). In contrast to the popularity of the lien creditor problem among the writers,
only two courts have been confronted with the issue. In these cases, In re Mel Golde
Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968), and In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960),
both the Sixth and Third Circuits adopted similar interpretations of § 2-702(3) but
reached different results. Both courts realized that the seller's claim was subject to the
rights of an intervening lien creditor, and concluded that the rights of the latter, visa-vis the reclaiming seller, were undefined in the Code. Thus, they found resort to the
appropriate pre-Code state law necessary for determining who should prevail. The
Sixth Circuit, applying Kentucky law, concluded that the rights of the reclaiming
seller were superior; the Third Circuit reached the opposite result under Pennsylvania
law. Assuming the courts' resort to pre-Code state law correct, the results in other
states would also differ according to the particular rights granted lien creditors and
reclaiming sellers in the identical situation.
3'6 U.C.C. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
AMENDMENT OF THE U.C.C. 3

(1967).

11Id. The cross-reference referred to in the Board's recommendations is found in
UCC § 2-702(3). That section directs the reader to § 2-403 of the Code for the rights of
a lien creditor. Section 2-403 does not define these rights, however, but further crossreferences the reader to Articles 6, 7 and 9. The ensuing search reveals that only § 9301(3) provides any definition of a lienor's rights, and as suggested in note 35 supra,
the applicability of that section is questionable. The initial cross-reference then offers
no clarification of the rights of lien creditors, and the Board's conclusion that it is
confusing appears sound.
1 It should be noted that an alternative interpretation, that it is necessary to look
to pre-Code state law because § 2-702 contains no provision as regards the rights of a
lien creditor against a reclaiming seller, may be offered. The result, however, would
be altered in only the few jurisdictions which previously held the rights of a lien
creditor superior. Moreover, the interpretation offered in the text seems more reasona-
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probable success of the reclaiming seller after the amendment, trustees were forced to turn to § 67(c)(1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act as a
means of defeating the defrauded seller's rights in bankruptcy.
Section 67(c)(1)(A), which invalidates all statutory liens that become effective on a debtor's insolvency, is the last in a long line of
bankruptcy legislation aimed at preventing state legislatures from
creating priorities in favor of certain classes of creditors. 39 The history
of this legislation reveals that all liens, whether consensual or nonconsensual, were originally held to be valid in bankruptcy unless invalidated by some specific provision of the Bankruptcy Act. 0 The Chandler Act of 193811 codified this case law in § 67(b),42 which validated
all statutory liens including those "arising or perfected while the
debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the
petition" in bankruptcy. 3 At the same time, Congress invalidated
virtually all state created priorities because they disturbed the order
of priority established in § 64 of the Act." In addition, the Chandler
Act subordinated payment of valid statutory liens to the federal administration and wage priorities because so many statutory liens had
been created that they often exhausted the bankrupt's estate, leaving
these priorities unpaid.45 As a result of these developments, many
state legislatures converted what would have been invalid priorities
into statutory liens under the pressure of various creditor groups.46
This proliferation of priorities as liens because of the advantageous
position of statutory liens on the priority ladder presented grave difficulties for the uniform priority scheme which Congress had sought to
establish.
To "check the growing trend in State statutes of labelling as 'liens'
what essentially are 'priorities,'" and to further the objective of the
Chandler Act "to build up, as far as feasible and equitable, the resible since the drafters of § 2-702(3) designated those whose rights should be considered,
and the omission of lien creditors indicates that their rights should never prevail over
those of a reclaiming seller.
11See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
11591, reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS (1966) 2459.
0 4 COLLIER 67.20 at 211.
" Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 1-703, 52 Stat. 840.
,2Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67(b), 52 Stat. 876.
13Id. at 876-77.

" Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See S. REp. No. 1159, 2 U.S. CODE
& AD.NEWS (1966) 2456-57.
" Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67(c), 52 Stat. 877. See S. REP. 1159, 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS (1966) 2457.
48 S.REP. 1159, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (1966) 2457.
CONG.
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dual fund for distribution among the general unsecured creditors," 7
Congress again amended the statutory lien provisions of the Bankruptcy Act in 1952.48 The most important change effected by these
amendments took place in § 67(c)(2),11 which invalidated as against
the trustee all state created statutory liens attached to personal property and not accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint. Like the Chandler Act before them, however, the 1952 amendments created additional problems: § 67(c)(2) invalidated some legitimate devices while leaving other clearly disguised priorities untouched;"0 it was unclear whether the possession standard was one of
actual or constructive possession;" and a priority conflict arose with
regard to the proper method of satisfying tax liens. 2 These difficulties
necessitated another revision of the § 67 lien provisions in 1966.11
Under the 1966 amendment Congress successfully eliminated the
tax lien priority problem presented by the 1952 amendments. 4 In
addition, the possession criteria and the distinction between real and
personal property were dropped as grounds for invalidation of statutory liens. Instead, Congress adopted new standards for invalidation
in § 67(c) (1) of the Act. These criteria provide that all statutory liens
which arise upon the insolvency of the debtor, 5 or which are not
perfected or enforceable against a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor on the date of bankruptcy,56 or which are for rent 7 are invalid
against the trustee. To preclude the possibility that some legitimate
security devices might be considered statutory liens because their
effectiveness depended on state recordation statutes," Congress also
47 Weinstein, Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act as Proposed and Pending Before the Congress, 24 REF. J. 28, 32 (1950).
" Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, §§ 1-54, 66 Stat. 420.

Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 21, 66 Stat. 428.
S. REP. 1159, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (1966) 2461.
5' CompareCity of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944) (requiring actual
possession) with Davis v. City of New York, 119 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1941) (allowing levy
followed by seizure). See 4 COLLIER T 67.281 at 415 n.8.
52 S.

REP. 1159, 2 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS

(1966) 2458-59. For a thorough

discussion of the shortcomings of the 1952 amendment regarding statutory liens, see
Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1955).
Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 4, 80 Stat. 268-69. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)
(1970).
5, Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (1970).
55 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970).
11 Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(C), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(C) (1970).

S. REP. 1159, 2 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS

(1966) 2460.
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added § 1(29a) to the Bankruptcy Act.59 This section defines "statutory lien" as:
a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien provided
by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether
or not such lien is also dependent upon statute and whether
or not the agreement is made fully effective by statute."
While this definition adequately serves the purpose for which it was
designed, it does not actually define the term "lien." The lack of such
definition raises the issue whether certain statutes, not specifically
designated as liens, are in fact "statutory liens" subject to the invalidation provisions of § 67(c) (1). In the Good Dealcase, the New Jersey
district court was confronted with this problem in its examination of
§ 2-702(2) of the UCC. Despite the lack of specific guidance, the court
nevertheless found that § 2-702(2) was a statutory lien invalid in
bankruptcy under § 67(c) (1) (A). In light of the history of the relevant
Code and Bankruptcy provisions, particularly with regard to the relative validity of the defrauded seller's right of rescission in bankruptcy
and the attempted continuation of this right in § 2-702(2) of the
Code, it appears that the district court drew too hasty a conclusion.
The district court in Good Deal focused on the "purpose and
effect" of UCC "32-702(2) in deciding first that it was a statutory lien
and then concluding that it was invalidated by § 67(c)(1)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Act. In deciding the first issue the court apparently
found it unnecessary to discuss whether the seller's right was indeed
statutory. Although it may be argued that § 2-702(2) of the Code is
merely a codification of common law and therefore not comprehended
within the meaning of the term "statutory,""1 it appears the district
court was correct in overlooking this position. One court has previously declared a banker's lien to be a statutory lien even though the
,Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 1, 80 Stat. 268, 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a)
(1970). The amendment arose from the Third Circuit's decision in In re Quaker City
Uniform Co., BANKR. L. REP. 58.728 (2d Cir. 1955), which labelled a chattel mortgage
dependent upon a state recordation statute for effectiveness against subsequent purchasers, a statutory lien. Although the decision was later withdrawn in In re Quaker
City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), and expressly rejected in In re New
Haven Watch & Clock Co., 253 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1958), Congress apparently felt
the need to finally resolve the issue.
60Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970).
",It should be noted that the invalidation provisions of § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act only apply to "statutory liens." Thus, even if the common law right of rescission
and reclamation is adjudged a lien, any conclusion that it is not a "statutory" right
within the meaning of § 67(c) would remove it from possible invalidation.
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statute defining the lien only codified common law.62 Moreover, a
decision that statutes codifying the common law are not included
within the term "statutory" would create severe practical problems.
Courts would be forced into the unenviable task of comparing statutes to their common law equivalents, measuring the changes made
in codification, and deciding in each case whether the statute corresponded sufficiently to the common law to avoid inclusion within the
term. For these reasons, it seems the New Jersey district court was
at least on firm ground in giving no attention to the "statutory"
argument. The court's decision that § 2-702(2) is a "lien," however,
is questionable at best.
The district court analogized § 2-702(2) to other state statutory
liens because it benefits "a particular class of creditors and tends to
promote a state created priority." 3 Regardless of whether these are
indeed characteristics of § 2-702(2), the court failed to complete the
analogy, overlooking the fact that the seller does not possess ordinary
lien rights. Normally, a lienor may force a sale of "the subject property to satisfy the indebtedness and recover or claim any deficiency
resulting thereon from the debtor as an unsecured creditor."" Under
§ 2-702, however, the reclaiming seller has no further remedy beyond
successful reclamation of the goods." The absence of the power to
realize the § 2-702(2) right by forcing a sale of the property, combined
with the exclusion of the right to claim for the difference between
resale and contract price, provides strong evidence that § 2-702(2) is
not a lien.66 The district court was remiss in not carrying the analogy
62 Goggin v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n., 183 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
15 UCC REP. SERV. at 626.
64 4A COLLIER T 70.41 at 493. The editors of COLLIER have previously raised the
argument presented in the text, that § 2-702(2) does not confer ordinary lien rights.
Nevertheless, the district court in Good Deal completely overlooked it.
UCC § 2-702(3).
86 Professor Countryman in his article Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy,
1 N. MEX. L. REV. 435, 455 (1971), suggests that a seller invoking UCC § 2-702(2) will
have difficulty distinguishing it from the vendor's privilege held a statutory lien in In
re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd, per curiam 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). He fails to note, however, that the Louisiana statute
gives the seller "a preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of
the purchaser," rather than a right to possession of the property. 283 F. Supp. at 623
n.2. The distinction can thus easily be made on the basis that a right to recover the
price is characteristic of a lien while recovery of the property is not. Indeed, a lien has
been defined as a "charge upon property . . .for the payment or discharge of a
particular debt or duty in priority to the general debts or duties of the owner." 51 Am.
JUR. 2d, Liens, § 1 (1970). The definition is synonymous with the Louisiana vendor's
privilege, but not with the seller's right of reclamation under § 2-702(2) of the UCC.
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to this point.
Besides the argument that the reclaiming seller does not possess
ordinary lien rights, there exist several other factors which support
the proposition that § 2-702(2) is not a lien. Of considerable importance is the fact that during consideration of the 1966 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act, no mention of their intended effect on any provision of the UCC was made.17 It has been suggested that this lack of
clarification was the result of a congressional assumption "that the
rights granted in Article 2 of the UCC cannot be deemed liens."6 Of
course, it can be argued to the contrary that Congress felt no need to
define the effect of the amendments on the Code, the new provisions
being explicit within themselves. In light of the historical recognition
of the reclaiming seller's right in bankruptcy courts, however, it
seems improbable that Congress would subject Code § 2-702(2) to the
invalidation provisions of § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act without some
mention of its intent to do so.
The bankruptcy courts' recognition of the seller's right to rescind
a sales contract and recover the goods also provides the basis for
another argument which the district court only superficially considered. Prior to the Code, the reclaiming seller had to satisfy the burden
of proving fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the buyer. 9
The drafters of § 2-702(2) sought to relax this burden by making an
insolvent buyer's receipt of goods conclusive evidence of fraud." It
may be argued, therefore, that § 2-702(2) merely changes the rules
of evidence, leaving the seller with his common law right of rescission
but affording him the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption. If this
be the case, § 2-702(2) would not seem to be subject to the invalidation provisions of § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, which apply only to
statutory liens.
The district court in Good Deal apparently recognized this position in its statement that the comments to § 2-702 suggest that only
an evidentiary change was intended,7 but chose instead to rely one
72
practical effect of the Code provision as the basis for its decision.
In so doing, the court ignored substantial authority which supports
the conclusion that § 2-702(2) merely changes the evidentiary aspects
of the state law of fraud rather than supplanting the former right of
4 COLLIER T 67.281 at 420-21.
Id. at 421.

See notes 20-29 and accompanying text supra.
§ 2-702, Comment 2. See Llewellyn, supra note 31.
7,15 UCC REP. SERV. at 625.
B9

70UCC

72Id. at 625-26.
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rescission.13 As the conclusive presumption of fraud is the only material change in the seller's right under § 2-702(2), the district court
should have considered in more detail the position that the reclaiming seller is not a lienor, but upon demand or rescission, the actual
owner of the property. This conclusion follows logically from earlier
cases holding that where the buyer has defrauded the seller, rescission of the contract automatically revests title in the latter. 74 Under
this analysis the defrauded seller holds neither a statutory right nor
a lien and, therefore, should not be subject to the invalidation provisions of § 67(c).
In relying instead on the practical effect of § 2-702(2) as the standard for determining whether or not the seller's right is a lien, the
district court made one final error. Although Congress failed to note
the intended effects of the 1966 bankruptcy amendments on the
Code, the rationale for the enactment of the new invalidating standards was offered. Senate Report Number 115915 reveals that the 1966
amendments, like those of 1952, were aimed at state created priorities
validated in bankruptcy under the rubric of liens. 7 The invalidation
of such priority devices, which often exhaust bankrupt estates at the
expense of federally designated priority claimants 77 and unsecured
creditors, is an unimpeachable- objective of bankruptcy legislation.
The New Jersey district court properly recognized the congressional
78
attempt to fulfill this purpose in quoting from the Senate Report.
In holding the application of § 2-702(2) contrary to the policy behind
amended § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, however, the court
71Comment 2 of § 2-702 specifically notes that the basis of reclamation is the
buyer's fraud. Thus the premise of the seller's right to rescind and recover is arguably
unchanged by § 2-702(2), and the former right of rescission is only altered by the
adoption of a new evidence requirement, a showing that the buyer was insolvent when
he received the goods, as conclusive of fraud. Such an analysis is apparently consistent
with the drafter's intentions, as indicated by Professor Llewellyn's explanation that §
2-702(2) "slightly enlarge[s] the existing law of reclamation." Llewellyn,
Memorandum in N.Y Law Rev. Comm'n, Report and Record of Hearings on the
Uniform Commercial Code, Legis. Doc. No. 65, 126 (1954) (emphasis added). Since §
2-702(2) represents a reasonable state judgment that fraud is present in the situation
described, and because the existence of fraud remains the essential element of reclamation, the district court in Good Deal should have considered more thoroughly whether
§ 2-702(2) merely offered a redefinition of the fraud required for exercise of the common
law right of rescission.
7,4A COLLIER 70.41 at 483.
,1S. REP. 1159, 2 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS (1966) 2456.
7 Id. at 2457.
77Id.
11 15 UCC REP. SERV. at 626.
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extended the congressional purpose beyond its reasonable scope.
Surely § 2-702(2) of the UCC benefits reclaiming sellers in bankruptcy, and in this light it might be argued that the Code section
disrupts the federally created order of priorities.79 The benefit afforded the defrauded seller, however, does not appear to be a priority
disruptive of the enunciated purpose of § 67(c)(1)(A). 0
The fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is equitable distribution of a bankrupt's assets. Ideally, accomplishment of this
objective would involve a pro rata distribution of the estate among
all creditors. Social, economic, and political pressures, however, have
resulted in deviation from a strict rule of equality.' One such deviation has been the recognition that a seller may recover his property
from a bankrupt buyer on proof of fraud. The basic principle which
justifies this result seems to be that other creditors of the bankrupt
should not profit from a wrong perpetrated by the debtor. Inattention
to the aspect of fraud, which underlies § 2-702(2), allows results contrary to this principle of unjust enrichment. To assert, as the district
court did, that § 2-702(2) is "inimical to the very purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act"82 because it disrupts the federally created order of
priorities, ignores the real purpose behind the 1966 amendments. The
invalidation provisions were aimed at liens that are essentially disguised priorities, created by states to avoid the invalidation of such
priorities under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 2-702(2), historically recognized in bankruptcy as the seller's right to rescind and
recover, has never been the subject of an attempted disguise. Nor has
the principle behind the rights afforded the reclaiming seller been
questioned in the courts. Indeed, if anything, § 2-702(2) of the Code
aids the trustee by limiting the time in which the defrauded seller
may make his demand. To hold that enactment of the 1966 amendments reveals Congress' intent to terminate recovery for defrauded
sellers is itself inimical the historical recognition of the defrauded
seller's right and the general maxim that a bankrupt's creditors
11Id. This argument forms the basis for the district court's conclusion that the
effect of UCC § 2-702(2) violates the general aim of the 1966 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act. The court, however, failed to consider the element of fraud inherent

in the seller's right to reclaim, and historically recognized as a ground for recovery
before satisfaction of priority claims. In addition, in concentrating on the general aim

of the amendments, the court overlooked the specific pilrpose of § 67(c)(1)(A), with
which Code § 2-702(2) does not seem to be in conflict. These factors are discussed in
the text accompanying notes 83-85 infra.
S. REP. 1159, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEwS (1966) 2461.
" Id. at 2457.
2 15 UCC REP. SErV. at 626.
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should not benefit from the bankrupt's wrongs.
However, if the courts do embrace the holding that § 2-702(2) of
the UCC is a statutory lien, it may be that a closer look at the
invalidation provisions of § 67(c) is necessary. Both courts that have
found § 2-702(2) to be a statutory lien have merely stated that it takes
effect upon the insolvency of the debtor-buyer, and is therefore invalid under § 67(c)(1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act. 83 It may be argued,
however, that § 2-702(2) is not necessarily invalidated in bankruptcy
by § 67(c)(1)(A) merely because insolvency of the debtor is one of the
factors required for application of the UCC provision. A contract for
sale on credit, the seller's discovery of the buyer's insolvency, and the
seller's demand within ten days of the buyer's receipt of the goods are
also required for maturation of the seller's right. Thus, for example,
a reclaiming seller might argue that his right to recover the goods
takes effect only when he demands their return within ten days of the
buyer's receipt rather than when the buyer becomes insolvent.
Even more persuasive is the argument that § 67(c)(1)(A) invalidates only those statutory liens which become effective when distribution of the buyer's assets is appropriate. This contention arises from
language contained in Senate Report Number 1159, which states that
§ 67(c)(1)(A) "strikes at liens which merely determine the order of
distributionupon insolvency or liquidation."' 84 If indeed § 67(c)(1)(A)
only invalidates those liens which arise upon an affirmative adjudication of a bankruptcy petition, § 2-702(2) would appear to be without
its scope. The Code provision requires only an insolvent debtor, not
11For the text of Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970),
see note 9 supra. The two cases that have held § 2-702(2) to be a statutory lien include
the case discussed in this comment, In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 15 UCC REP.
SERv. 624 (D.N.J. 1974), and a case from the Eastern District of Michigan, In re
Federal's, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973). In the Federal's case the
district court took the same approach as the court in Good Deal, examining the effect
of Code § 2-702(2) and concluding that it constituted a priority in conflict with the
federally designed priority order. In so concluding, the court found it to be in essence
a statutory lien of the type Congress sought to eliminate by enacting § 67(c)(1)(A).
The court, however, did not stop at this point, but held that because a conflict in
statutes existed and § 2-702(2) was thus inapplicable in bankruptcy, resort to pre-Code
state law was necessary for a determination of the seller's rights. Since the seller had
failed to show an intent not to pay on the part of the buyer, a pre-Code prerequisite
to recovery in Michigan, the trustee prevailed. The latter part of the Federal'sdecision
has been criticized for this resort to pre-Code law. R. Duesenberg and L. King, 3A
Bender's UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 13.03[4] at 13-18 n.23.1 (Supp. 1974).
Regardless of the possible incorrectness of the district court's return to the common
law, the Federal's decision is otherwise identical to Good Deal, and therefore subject
to the same criticisms raised in this comment.
11S. REP. 1159, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (1966) 2461.
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one who has been adjudged a bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act.
In addition, although insolvency under the UCC includes the bankruptcy definition,"5 an insolvent is also defined under the Code as one
"who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of
business or cannot pay his debts as they become due. .. ."I' Thus
the right to reclaim arguably arises outside of bankruptcy, under a
different standard than that utilized in § 67(c)(1)(A), and therefore
§ 2-702(2) would seem not to be invalidated by § 67(c)(1)(A).
If Code § 2-702(2) escapes invalidation under either of these arguments, however, it will also have to avoid § 67(c) (1) (B) 7 which invalidates as against the trustee all statutory liens ineffective against a
bona fide purchaser of the goods on the date of bankruptcy. Initially,
the seller's right would appear to fail under this test as it is subject
to the rights of a bona fide purchaser under § 2-702(3).m However, the
proviso to § 67(c)(1)(B) specifies that if § 2-702(2) is not invalid
against the trustee under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, the seller's
right to reclaim may be perfected after the date of bankruptcy against
a bona fide purchaser. 9 With the deletion of the lien creditor limitation from § 2-702(3), and assuming the seller perfects by demand
within ten days after the buyer's receipt of the goods, Code § 2-702(2)
will pass muster under this invalidation provision." Until this argument is fully considered, then, it must be concluded that Code § 2702(2), even if designated a statutory lien, should not automatically
be invalidated in bankruptcy.
UCC § 1-201(23). A person is deemed insolvent under the Bankruptcy Act
. . . whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property
which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or
permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder,
or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in
amount to pay his debts.
Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
UCC § 1-201(23).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970).
UCC § 2-702(3). For the text of § 2-702(3), see note 5 supra.
Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (1970).
88 The first proviso to § 67(c)(1)(B) would allow the seller to reclaim his goods
within the ten day period, including the time after the petition for bankruptcy has been
filed, if his lien is superior to that of a trustee under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 70(c) grants the trustee the power of a hypothetical lien creditor, and until the
dispute regarding the lien creditor limitation in Code § 2-702(3) is finally resolved, the
seller's success under the proviso will remain uncertain. If the deletion of the lien
creditor limitation from § 2-702(3) has the predicted effect of securing the seller's right
to reclaim against such lienor in the ten day period, however, the seller should be able
to defeat the trustee's power as a bona fide purchaser under the proviso to §
67(c)(1)(B). See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
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The failure of the district court in Good Deal to consider the
factors discussed above renders its conclusion that § 2-702(2) is a
statutory lien invalid in bankruptcy under § 67(c) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act highly questionable. The absence of full lien rights in the
seller's reclamation privilege, and the lack of clear congressional inteat to include UCC § 2-702(2) within the term "statutory lien,"
provide strong evidence that the seller's right to reclaim is not a lien
within the purview of the Bankruptcy Act. In addition, since the
conclusive presumption of fraud is the only substantial change in the
seller's historical right to rescind and recover made by § 2-702(2),
there is adequate reason to consider the UCC provision as only a rule
of evidence. Finally, the district court's assertion that the seller's
right to reclaim is inimical to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act
overlooks the true effect of § 2-702(2). Certainly there is a legitimate
purpose in protecting the debtor's assets from depletion and preserving the federal priority order, but that purpose does not contemplate
the perpetuation of the debtor's fraudulent gains. Section 2-702(2) is
not a disguised priority, the explicit device at which § 67(c) (1) (A) was
aimed. It merely continues and makes uniform a right long recognized in bankruptcy, and by limiting that right to ten days, aids the
trustee in preserving the bankrupt's estate. In light of these considerations, and the possibility that even if § 2-702(2) is a statutory lien
it is not invalid under § 67(c), the district court's opinion in Good
Deal can only be viewed as a superficial preliminary to a developing
controversy. Until a clear indication of the intended scope of the
statutory lien invalidation provisions is provided by Congress, the
court's analysis in Good Deal should not be considered decisive of the
issue.
C. LYNCH CHRISTIAN,
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